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I.
INTRODUCTION
For the animal shall not be measured by man. In a world older
and more complete than ours, they move, finished and complete,
gifted with extensions of the senses we have lost or never attained,
living by voices we shall never hear. They are not brethren, they
are not underlings, they are other nations caught with ours in the
net of life and time, fellow prisoners of the splendour
and travail of the earth.'
Most Americans spend the majority of our time in artificial
environments of our own making. We live indoors, in a sealed-
off land of bug spray, temperature control, and an array of an-
tibacterial products for our hands, dishes, and countertops. We
keep our plants alive by providing all of their daily care and al-
lowing them to live in an insect-free environment, then we climb
into bed and cuddle up to our furry four-legged companions. We
have developed a widely-shared informal hierarchy of life-forms.
However, these choices come at our peril because, as comforta-
ble as we have become in our cozy indoor retreats, we still in-
habit a larger world whose ability to support life is dependent
1. HENRY BESTON, THE OUTERMOST HOUSE: A YEAR OF LiFE ON THE GREAT
BEACH OF CAPE COD 25 (1st ed. 1928).
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upon the maintenance of species we may not regard so highly.
We depend upon this natural world both for our aesthetic and
spiritual enrichment and for our very survival. Our personal
preferences are not helpful in selecting species for preservation
as they do not correlate with their value to biodiversity. That is
why a more objective system is needed, as it forces us to set aside
our personal preferences. That is why the system we do have was
designed to protect all species equally. In the real world, ecosys-
tems depend upon biodiversity that does not rank species accord-
ing to how lovable they are to humans.2
Congress expressly recognized the disparity between human
valuation of species and nature's diverse needs and stated its in-
tent to protect species equally.3 Just a few years later, in 1973,
Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA),4 intended
"to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost."'9 This effort came at a crucial time, as species
now go extinct at a rate of approximately one-hundred per day, a
rate which continues to rise6 despite already "far exceed[ing] any
the world has experienced in the last 65 million years."'7
Despite Congress' attempt to give us the tools to slow down
this rapid loss of biodiversity, we have frittered away that oppor-
tunity by bickering over which species we like best and our corre-
sponding willingness to make sacrifices to protect them. The best
2. See E. 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE XXiii (2d ed. 1999) ("Recent experi-
mental studies on whole ecosystems support what was long suspected: in most cases,
the more species living in an ecosystem, the higher its productivity and the greater
its ability to withstand drought and other kinds of environmental stress. Since we
depend on an abundance of functioning ecosystems to cleanse our water, enrich our
soil, and manufacture the very air we breathe, biodiversity is clearly not an inheri-
tance to be discarded carelessly."). At a time of increasing global climate change,
ecosystem resiliency is especially important.
3. The Senate Report connected with earlier endangered species legislation noted
that "with each species we eliminate, we reduce the pool of germ-plasm available for
use by man in future years. Since each living species and subspecies has developed
in a unique way to adapt itself to the difficulty of living in the world's environment,
as a species is lost, its distinctive gene material, which may subsequently prove inval-
uable to mankind in improving domestic animals or increasing resistance to disease
or environmental contaminants, is also irretrievably lost." S. REP. No. 91-526, at 3
(1969). The same report went on to cite the above Henry Beston quote. Id.
4. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
5. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
6. Tim W. Clark, A Course on Species and Ecosystem Conservation: An Interdisci-
plinary Approach, YALE SCH. OF FORESTRY & ENVTL. STUDIES, BULLETIN SERIES
No. 105, SPECIES AND ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AP-
PROACH 17, 33 (Tim W. Clark et al. eds., 2001).
7. Kent E. Holsinger, Population Biology for Policy Makers: Promises and Para-
doxes, 45 BIOSCIENCE S-10, S-11 (1995).
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way to free ourselves from this quagmire is to reduce the flexibil-
ity that engenders such frequent controversies. Congress ex-
pressed its desire to protect species equally, and several decades
later it is getting more and more urgent that we find a way to
implement that goal.
As I discuss in greater detail below, the route a species must
take to reach the protections of the ESA begins with getting
placed on a list of either endangered or threatened species. Con-
gress has described this listing process as "the keystone of the
Endangered Species Act."' 8 The importance of listing properly
becomes obvious when considering the fact that ESA protection
is an all-or-nothing game-either you get it or you don't-and
the only dividing line is listing.9 ' As a prerequisite for the applica-
tion of any other provision of the Act, listing is the single most
important part of the Act.
Our system of listing species, like most others around the
world, is based upon a determination of the viability of each spe-
cies. We engage in population viability analysis to determine the
health of a species. That said, the scientific process of population
viability analysis needs a set of questions to answer. In other
words, what levels of viability are we looking for? Before scien-
tists can determine whether a species fits into a listing category,
we must first determine-as a policy matter-what the criteria
are for inclusion in that category. As it stands, we have only
loose definitions and factors upon which to base these analyses,
resulting in an extreme lack of consistency. As will be discussed
further below, I propose the use of quantitative criteria for each
listing category. Quantitative criteria are numerical thresholds
applicable across the board (such as x percentage decline over y
years or z generations, x total population remaining, x amount of
geographic range, etc.).
Part II of this article provides necessary background informa-
tion on the listing process. Part III discusses the numerous
problems with the listing status quo, which combine to prevent us
from meaningfully realizing the expectations Congress had for
the listing process. Part IV provides the support for my primary
8. H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 10 (1982).
9. See Daniel J. Rohlf, There's Something Fishy Going On Here: A Critique of the
National Marine Fisheries Service's Definition of Species Under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 617, 619 (1994) ("Although characterized as the 'pit.bull of
federal environmental statutes,' the ESA is as meek as a kitten unless an imperiled
creature appears on the statute's lists of threatened and endangered species.").
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thesis-that we can and should devise quantitative listing crite-
ria-and suggests a superior model from which to work. Finally,
Part V considers the various ways to accomplish the goals
presented here. The article then concludes with a plea to the
new administration to make this change.
II.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ESA AND LISTING SPECIES
A. In the Beginning: The Evolution of U.S. Endangered
Species Legislation and Listing Priorities
The first U.S. endangered species legislation, the Endangered
Species Preservation Act of 1966,10 was the result of the Depart-
ment of Interior's effort to obtain funding for an endangered spe-
cies program after failed attempts to get that funding absent a
preservation statute.11 The 1966 Act required the Secretary of
the Interior to list species that were threatened with extinction, 12
in consultation "with various scientific groups having expertise in
this field."' 13 The Departments of Interior, Agriculture, and De-
fense were all charged with protecting these species and their
habitats.' 4
Next came the Endangered Species Conservation Act of
1969,15 which increased protections for invertebrate species and
restrictions on interstate commerce in listed species. 16 The 1969
Act included listing language still in use today, requiring the de-
cisions be based on "the best scientific and commercial data
available. 17 The term "commercial data" refers only to data
that goes to a species' vulnerability-such as threats from overu-
tilization in commerce-and not to the consideration of eco-
nomic factors, as Congress later clarified.' 8 While the legislative
history does not elucidate the meaning of "best scientific data
10. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926
(1966). A discussion of the Act's provisions may be found in MICHAEL J. BEAN,
THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 319-21 (revised and expanded ed.
1983).
11. See S. REP. No. 89-1463, at 1, 2, 17 (1966).
12. Endangered Species Preservation Act § 1(c).
13. S. REP. No. 89-1463, at 3.
14. Endangered Species Preservation Act § 1(b).
15. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat.
275 (1969). A discussion of the Act's provisions may be found in BEAN, supra note
10, at 374-79.
16. See Endangered Species Conservation Act §§ 1(2), 2, 4(d), 12(a).
17. Id. § 3(a).
18. H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 20 (1982).
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available," a "plausible explanation is that Congress intended
through this language to continue the 1966 Act's requirement
that Interior seek the input of independent biologists before
making listing decisions." 19 If this explanation is true, we must
take into account an obvious goal behind this requirement, which
was to increase objectivity and consistency in the listing process.
In 1973, the ESA, which was made possible by the enormous
political support for environmental ideals at the time, became
"the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of en-
dangered species ever enacted by any nation. '20 Among the nu-
merous improvements (from the preservation perspective) were
the inclusion of species not yet on the brink of the abyss,21 pro-
tection for plant species, 22 prohibitions of private actions on pri-
vate land,23 and a requirement that federal agencies must not
jeopardize the continued existence of a protected species.24 The
ESA's 1982 amendments also made a key change to the listing
process, adding the word "solely" before the existing language of
listing "on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data
available," 25 thus creating the somewhat controversial "strictly
science mandate. '26 The purpose of this change was to do away
with the irrelevant economic impact analyses being conducted by
the Reagan administration and require listing determinations to
be purely about a species' biological condition.27
At several points in the evolution of the ESA, Congress has
made it clear that the listing process was intended to move for-
ward as quickly and efficiently as possible. First, in explaining
why the 1969 Act did not require the formal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act procedures to be followed, Congress stated that "[i]f
the full right of hearing and judicial review is granted, the publi-
cation of the final list may be delayed for many months-months
which may be crucial in determining whether a given species or
19. Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why
Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1043 (1997).
20. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
21. See Pub. L. No. 93-205, §§ 3(15), 4(d). Threatened status was to be granted
generously to any species at a "measurable risk" of extinction. H.R. REP. No. 93-
412, at 11 (1973).
22. See Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 3(11).
23. See id. § 9.
24. See id. § 7.
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1).
26. For an in-depth discussion of this requirement, see generally Doremus, supra
note 19.
27. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-835, at 20 (1982).
STRENGTH IN NUMBERS
subspecies will be able to survive."' 28 In 1979, concerned with the
slow pace of listing that had resulted in only a tiny percentage of
listings out of thousands of candidates, 29 Congress established a
priority system for considering species for listing.30 By 1988, the
problem of delay had gotten out of control, with over 3000 candi-
date species, including nearly 1000 already deemed eligible but
not yet listed, and only about 50 species being listed per year. 31
Congress expressed concern that this rate would result in many
species becoming extinct while they waited. 32 Accordingly, they
directed the Secretary to monitor all candidate species and
"make prompt use" of the emergency listing process to prevent
such loss. 33
B. The ESA Listing Process
The power to list endangered and threatened species belongs
to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce,
who have delegated that power to the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), respec-
tively (collectively "the Services"). 34 The majority of species-
terrestrial species and freshwater fish-are the responsibility of
FWS, whereas NMFS is generally charged with the protection of
marine species and anadromous fish, such as salmonids.
A species is endangered if it "is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range, '35 and it is
threatened if it "is likely to become an endangered species within
the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of
its range. ' 36 In determining whether a species fits into one of
these two categories, the Services must consider five factors:
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or cur-
tailment of its habitat or range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or
educational purposes;
28. S. REP. No. 91-526, at 1419 (1969).
29. H.R. REP. No. 96-167 (1979).
30. Act of December 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 3(6), 93 Stat. 1225-26 (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(h)(3) (1988)).
31. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-478, 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 2306.
32. Id. at 2707.
33. Act of October 7, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-478, § 1002(a), 102 Stat. 2306 (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(iii) (1988)).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(1); 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2006).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
.36. Id. § 1532(20).
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(C) disease or predation;
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued
existence. 37
While these factors do constitute "criteria" to consider in de-
termining a species' listing status, these criteria are highly gener-
alized. They offer factors to subjectively consider, but no
formulae to follow.
Citizens may petition the Secretary to list, uplist, downlist, or
delist a species, 38 and the Secretary must acknowledge the peti-
tion within thirty days.39 The Secretary has ninety days to deter-
mine whether the petition "presents substantial scientific or
commercial information indicating that the petitioned action may
be warranted. '40 Substantial information means "that amount of
information that would lead a reasonable person to believe that
the measure proposed in the petition may be warranted. '41 If
the petition passes this bar, the Secretary must then commence a
status review of the species, 42 and is required within twelve
months to determine whether the listing is warranted, not war-
ranted, or warranted but precluded by competing demands. 43
The final category-warranted but precluded-was the
brainchild of the Reagan Administration, putatively to allow
those species in greatest need to be addressed first.44 It was
never intended "to allow the Secretary to delay commencing the
rulemaking process for any reason other than the existence of
pending or imminent proposals to list species subject to a greater
degree of threat. '45 In reality, however, it has become a major
source of additional discretion, leading to politically-based deci-
sions rather than prioritization on the basis of threat. The cate-
gory is an ER waiting room strewn with the corpses of those
species who were forced to wait too long.
37. Id. § 1533(a)(1).
38. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
39. 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(a).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
41. 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b).
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
43. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
44. H.R. REP. No. 97-567 (1982).
45. Id..
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The status review is to be conducted in the same manner for
citizen petitions as it is for those initiated by the agency.46 The
Services have issued policy statements regarding the information
standards for the status review process. Some of the require-
ments thus created are: (1) biologists must evaluate all informa-
tion used, 47 (2) these biologists must prefer primary sources
wherever possible,48 (3) they must also seek out and objectively
evaluate data that conflicts with the agency's position on the ad-
visability of the listing49 and (4) the agency must obtain peer re-
view by "three appropriate and independent specialists" for all
listing proposals. 50 Although these procedures generally coin-
cide with those of the scientific. method, it is worth noting that
the agencies have not relinquished any discretion here. The
scientists are either agency biologists or, in the case of the three
mandatory peer reviews, specialists hand-selected by the agency.
In addition to selecting the peer reviewers, the agency is also free
to choose not to follow their advice, though it does have to in-
clude a summary of their views in the final rule.51
As noted above, the status review results in one of three possi-
ble findings. A negative finding-either not warranted or war-
ranted but precluded-is subject to immediate judicial review. 52
A warranted finding leads to the administrative rulemaking pro-
cess before listing, and is thus not a final agency action subject to
review.53 Finally, if the agency does not take action within the
required time limits, citizens can sue to compel agency action.54
Once an action is deemed warranted, a final proposed listing
regulation is published,55 and citizens have forty-five days to re-
quest a hearing. 56 The public has sixty days to comment on the
46. Kevin Cassidy, Endangered Species' Slippery Slope Back to the States: Existing
Regulatory Mechanisms and Ongoing Conservation Efforts Under the Endangered
Species Act, 32 ENvT. L. 175, 188 (2002).
47. Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy on Information Standards Under
the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,271 (July 1, 1994).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for Peer Review in Endangered
Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270 (July 1, 1994).
51. Id.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(ii).
53. James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A
Closeup Look From a Litigator's Perspective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499, 513 n.55 (1991).
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
55. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
56. Id. § 1533(b)(5)(E); 50 C.F.R. § 424.16(c)(3).
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proposed listing,57 and the final published rule includes a review
of these comments, summaries and explanations of any data
used, and "a summary of factors affecting the species. '58 The
listing is to take effect no less than thirty days after the publica-
tion of the final rule, and no less than ninety days after it was
formally proposed. 59
C. Lock, Stock, and Barrel: The Benefits of Getting Past the
Velvet Rope
Although.the listing process is somewhat broken, in the event
that a species is lucky enough to make it through, the ESA has
much to offer. It is because of the extensive protections offered
these species that the ESA is so often called the "pit bull" of
environmental legislation.60 This view, of course, ignores the fact
that these generous protections are exceedingly difficult to come
by, resulting in a statute with far duller teeth. In any event, the
protective portion of the ESA is quite powerful, which is why the
listing process is so incredibly important.
The first thing the agency must do upon listing a species is to
designate critical habitat to allow that species some living
space.61 The listing then "triggers the duty to prepare a recovery
plan; the duty to conserve the species; the duty to consult; the
duty to ensure that federal action is not likely to 'jeopardize'
listed species or adversely modify critical habitat; and a prohibi-
tion on 'taking' listed species."' 62 The following is a slightly more
detailed description of the two most key protective sections of
the ESA: the section 7 consultation requirement and the section
9 take prohibition.
57. 50 C.F.R. § 424.16(c)(2).
58. Id. § 424.18(a).
59. Id. § 424.18(b)(1)-(2).
60. See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins, An Ivory Tower Perspective on Endan-
gered Species Law, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 3 (1993); Oliver A. Houck, The
Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior
and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 279 (1993); Robert D. Thornton, Search-
ing for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning Under the En-
dangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605, 605 (1991); Steven P. Quarles, The
Pit Bull Goes to School, 15 ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 55; Timothy Egan, Strong-
est U.S. Environment Law May Become Endangered Species, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
1992, at All.
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i).
62. Laurence Michael Bogert, That's My Story and I'm Stickin' to It: Is the "Best
Available" Science Any Available Science Under the Endangered Species Act?, 31
IDAHO L. REV. 85, 96 (1994) (internal citations to the statute omitted).
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Section 7 requires all federal agencies to ensure that the ac-
tions they carry out, fund or authorize (such as by granting per-
mits to private individuals) are not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any listed species or adversely modify any
designated critical habitat.63 The action agency accomplishes this
via formal consultation with the wildlife agency responsible for
the listed species at issue, which includes any species that may be
affected by the agency action. 64 The Secretary must then issue a
formal biological opinion determining whether the action is or is
not likely to jeopardize the species or adversely modify the criti-
cal habitat.65 The action agency holds the ultimate responsibility
for compliance with the section and is not bound by the biologi-
cal opinion in determining how to proceed. 66
Section 9 prohibits any person, public or private, from "tak-
ing" a listed species of fish or wildlife. 67 "Take" is a term of art-
and a relatively broad one-encompassing both direct harm to
the animals and indirect harm through habitat alterations that
injure the animals.68 "Section 9 imposes extraordinarily broad
liability, particularly in comparison to the laws that preceded
it.'"69 The ESA directly entitles endangered species to this pro-
tection, while threatened species can only obtain section 9 pro-
tection via regulations. 70 All threatened species (with limited
exceptions) governed by FWS have this coverage, 71 and NMFS
provides it case-by-case to individual species. 72
III.
DOOMED FROM THE START: HISTORY OF A FLAWED
AND DAMAGED LISTING SYSTEM
After several decades with an inadequate process for listing
decisionmaking, the ESA has developed quite a checkered his-
tory. Beginning with an unclear statutory directive, followed by
immense political pressures on adiinistrations unwilling or una-
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
64. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4).
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
66. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1976); 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.15.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).
68. Id. § 1532(19).
69. Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species
Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENvmn. L. 397, 405 (2004).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
71. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (1995).
72. 50 C.F.R. § 223.201 to 223.205.
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ble to come up with a well-organized listing plan, the candidate
species backlog has continually increased. This Part reviews
what is wrong, finding that the listing system was both initially
flawed and then further damaged over time.
A. A Poorly Articulated Directive: Ambiguity and Excessive
Discretion
The well-meaning and passionate goals of the ESA were ill-
fated from the start. In directing the agencies to list species, the
ESA uses ambiguous language, without strict definitions for the
most key terms. The agencies are to list species as either
"threatened" or "endangered" on the basis of the "best science
available," but none of these terms have any sort of universal
meaning. Indeed, the listing requirement can barely be deemed
to have an "intelligible principle," as required to maintain its
constitutionality. 73
1. This "Best" is Better Than What, Exactly?
"Best" is a purely relative term. It connotes no actual quality
of its own, but is merely better than everything else similarly de-
fined, assuming there is anything else. "'Best' ... obviously does
not mean good, reliable, conclusive, adequate or accurate. It
means better than something worse, which could be and obvi-
ously is sometimes-bad. '74 Courts have been reticent to ana-
lyze the meaning of this "best science" requirement, resting on
the powerful combination of APA arbitrary and capricious re-
view and Chevron deference. 75 As a result, "the listing process
has become tautological: the science is adequate to support a list-
ing decision under section 4 if the Secretary" deems it So.76
2. How Endangered is Endangered? How Threatened is
Threatened?
In determining the degree of vulnerability a species faces,
there is no scientifically accepted biological definition for either
73. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If Congress
shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
74. Robert E. Gordon, Jr., When the Best Available Data is B.A.D., The Data
Error Plague, NWI RESOURCE, Summer 1993, at 7 (expressing concern that species
are wrongly listed due to bad data and citing to delistings for support of this theory).
75. Bogert, supra note 62, at 140.
76. Id.
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"threatened" or "endangered. ' 77 In everyday unscientific usage
they actually have very similar meanings, which involve some
kind of exposure to danger.7s As a policy matter, these terms
suggest some threshold of risk, indeed two distinct thresholds,
but the ESA is silent as to where these thresholds lie.79 Given
that every species on earth faces some risk of extinction at some
point in the future, these words are meaningless without further
explanation.
Some further explanation is indeed supplied. A species is en-
dangered if it "is in danger of extinction throughout all or a sig-
nificant portion of its range,"' 80 and it is threatened if it "is likely
to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future
throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 8' Looking
first at the definition of "endangered," one can see that it suffers
from the same ambiguity as the term alone-all species are in
danger of becoming extinct at some point.8 2 The only clarity this
definition provides is the particular danger with which the term
"endangered" is concerned: extinction. This is better than noth-
ing, but not much.
The definition of "threatened" doubles this ambiguity. First,
the statute is concerned with species that are "likely" to become
endangered. The statute gives no indication of how likely endan-
germent must be, a fact which only adds to the ambiguity of the
term "endangered," which, as discussed earlier, has no set mean-
ing. Further, the term "foreseeable" is also ambiguous. The only
thing that is fairly clear about the degree of threat needed for
each category is that listed "species must face more than a de
minimis threat," and those listed as endangered "should face a
greater or more immediate threat than threatened ones. '8 3
3. That's a Lot of Discretion.
So how are the Services to determine which species to list in
which category, based on what standards, and requiring how
much scientific data? These are completely open questions left
77. Kristin Carden, Bridging the Divide: The Role of Science in Species Conserva-
tion Law, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 165, 200 (2006).
78. Doremus, supra note 19, at 1113.
79. Id.
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
81. Id. § 1532(20).
82. Indeed, all species will become extinct at some point, as surely as death and
taxes.
83. Doremus, supra note 19, at 1117.
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entirely to the agencies to decide. Given that the essential func-
tioning of the statute rests on these questions, this leaves the
agencies with significant-arguably legislative-power and
discretion.
Agencies are far less democratically accountable than Con-
gress, and are generally kept in check by the judiciary, but courts
need standards against which to check the agencies' actions.
Without clear direction from a statute as to exactly what methods
an agency is expected to implement, the only kind of error a
court can look for is that of extreme misbehavior.84
B. The Fallibilities of Science in Relation to the ESA
There are some additional flaws with the statutory text rele-
vant to this discussion, but not entirely appropriate for inclusion
in the preceding subsection because ambiguity is not the source
of these problems. Indeed, Congress was quite clear on this
point: listing decisions are to be based solely on the best available
science.85 This strictly science mandate is problematic in at least
two notable ways, both of which involve science's weaknesses as
a policy machine. First, as many other scholars have pointed
out,86 science cannot make policy decisions, so questions which
retain any elements of policy cannot be answered solely on the
basis of science. Second, science is inherently uncertain, and cer-
tainty is often demanded in legal settings. The ESA lacks any
direction as to how the agencies and the courts are to deal with
uncertainty.
84. J.B. Ruhl, The Battle Over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL.
L. 555, 579 (2004) ("The fewer methodological constraints a statute places on an
agency, the less opportunity a court has to measure the agency's use of professional
judgment against anything other than a test for behavior that is obviously the result
of blind ambition or sheer arrogance."); see also Doremus, supra note 19, at 1124
("The lack of openly-discussed standards for determining whether species are en-
dangered, threatened, or ineligible for listing effectively leaves the agencies free to
adopt virtually any decision with virtually no discussion and little fear of judicial
reversal.").
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1).
86. See, e.g., Katherine Renshaw, Leaving the Fox to Guard the Henhouse: Bring-
ing Accountability to Consultation Under the Endangered Species Act, 32 COLUM. J.
ENvTL. L. 161, 174-75 (2007); Carden, supra note 77 at 202; Cary Coglianese & Gary
E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U.
PA. L. REV. 1255, 1257-58 (2004); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic
Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1628 (1995).
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1. Science Cannot Determine Policy
Although the language of the ESA suggests that the standards for
making decisions about listing, jeopardy, etc., are to be purely sci-
entific, analyses of ESA implementation show clearly that trade-
offs among conflicting objectives must be made in almost every
instance.87
In light of the unambiguously strict mandate, "Congress has
forced the listing agencies into a 'science charade,' in which they
must pretend to make non-scientific decisions entirely on the ba-
sis of science. '88 The task to which Congress has set the agencies
is impossible to implement, as conservation choices cannot be
made by science alone without injecting policy considerations.8 9
The result is that agencies are forced to do their decisionmaking
in private, without revealing their prohibited policy considera-
tions, which renders their already unchecked power even less
accountable.
The ambiguities in the statute leave significant policy choices
unmade: How much risk is our society willing to take that species
will be lost forever? How many sacrifices are people willing to
make to prevent this? More specifically, how endangered does a
species have to be to get listed in either category? These ques-
tions have not been generally answered anywhere. As pure pol-
icy questions, they certainly cannot be answered scientifically.
Scientists have been trying to get this across as well, com-
plaining: "Conservationists have commonly confused the task of
assessing extinction risk with that of setting priorities for conser-
vation action. Assessing the risk of extinction is a purely biologi-
cal problem," whereas setting conservation priorities requires
more subjective considerations. 90 As one biologist astutely
pointed out, the passing of the buck to "science" has led the
agencies to make these policy decisions separately for each spe-
cies, which makes for very unscientific policy:
The threshold at which a species is defined as endangered, as Mark
Shaffer (1981) has pointed out, is essentially a policy rather than a
87. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT 134 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
88. Doremus, supra note 19, at 1035 (internal citation omitted).
89. Id. at 1056.
90. Holsinger, supra note 7, at S-10; see also Timothy H. Tear et al., How Much is
Enough? The Recurrent Problem of Setting Measurable Objectives in Conservation,
55 BIOSCIENCE 835, 838 (2005) ("The job of scientists is to make clear exactly what
numerical objective is required to reach an associated goal. It is society's choice to
revisit and modify conservation goals in light of scientific information.").
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science decision. Such policy decisions are made on a species-by-
species basis, leading to decisions of endangerment that are not eq-
uitable across species. Courts, lacking scientific knowledge and
specific biological criteria with which to judge decisions, typically
defer to the expertise of the implementing agency.91
There is no serious question that policy decisions remain that
go beyond the text of the ESA, yet none of the branches of gov-
ernment have yet attempted to deal with these choices. Absent
clear criteria for determining whether a species is threatened, en-
dangered, or neither, the agencies will continue to reinvent the
values wheel for each and every listing decision. Even with the
best of intentions, there is no way to achieve any consistency with
this system.
2. Nothing is Certain: Deal With It
I promise nothing complete; because any human thing supposed to
be complete, must for that very reason infallibly be faulty.
Herman Melville, Moby Dick
A fundamental difference between science and policy is the
differing expectation of certainty. Scientists work toward cer-
tainty, never expecting to reach it, but hoping to get as close as
possible to that elusive goal.92 Policymakers, on the other hand,
tend to prefer more absolute information upon which to make
their decisions. They seek a perfectly understandable world that
scientists know cannot exist. When it comes to implementing the
ESA, there will rarely be enough data to be certain regarding a
species vulnerability status, yet we must move ahead with the
process anyway.93 The agencies must decide quickly, often
before they are able to gather all relevant information on even
the best-studied species, if there is to be any hope of saving those
in need of help.94
91. Andrea Easter-Pilcher, Implementing the Endangered Species Act, 46 BioS-
CIENCE 355, 362 (1996).
92. See Dennis D. Murphy & Barry D. Noon, Coping with Uncertainty in Wildlife
Biology, 55 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 773, 775-76 (1991) (describing scientific knowledge
as a building constantly being bombarded with data bricks that reveal its weak spots,
which are reinforced before the building is then further bombarded, eventually re-
vealing fewer and fewer weak points).
93. Carden, supra note 77, at 203.
94. Sasha Gennet, New ESA Amendments: Sound Science or Political Shell
Game?, 54 BIOSCIENCE 1070 (2004) ("ESA decisions about endangered species are
necessarily made before all the pertinent information on even well-studied species
can be compiled.").
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The courts have also recognized this situation, requiring the
agencies to move forward in spite of incomplete data, stating that
they "must rely on even inconclusive or uncertain information if
that is the best available at [decision] time."' 95 Indeed, simply by
invoking science at all, Congress implicitly endorsed reliance on
uncertain information, because "[i]t is inevitable, given the na-
ture of science and the nature of species conservation, that agen-
cies must often act with an incomplete understanding. '96 It is
clear that the agencies must act in spite of missing or uncertain
data, but they have yet to adequately deal with the situation.
Dealing with uncertainty is no passive thing-it is not about
acceptance, but rather actions that must be taken to address it.
The response to uncertainty needs to move from avoidance to
accommodation. 97 In order to work toward more consistent and
objective decisionmaking, "lawmakers must understand and pro-
vide for the data gaps and uncertainties that characterize science
in general, and ecosystem-based science in particular." 98 One
method of actually reducing uncertainty without additional data
is to set well-defined criteria. As one biologist has noted, "such a
methodology would aid in reducing uncertainty and allow for
more equitable and objective comparison of species by their de-
gree of vulnerability.
'
"
99
Not only is uncertainty acceptable in science in general, but it
is especially unavoidable in environmental decisionmaking. Con-
sider, for example, the fact that the ESA listing process comes
with deadlines100 and requires no independent agency research to
add to the existing data pool.10 1 Given that the data has been so
expressly limited (most of all by the time constraints), requiring a
95. Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 2002 WL 1733618 at *9
(D.D.C. 2002);-see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 958 F. Supp. 670, 680
(D.D.C. 1997) (the ESA's best available science mandate "require[s] far less than
'conclusive evidence.' ").
96. Carden, supra note 77, at 189.
97. Doremus, supra note 19, at 1036 ("Instead of pretending that uncertainty can
be avoided, we must learn how best to factor it into decisions.").
98. Carden, supra note 77, at 169.
99. Easter-Pilcher, supra note 91, at 355.
100. This is by necessity, as we do not have an indefinite time to make these
decisions regardless of the legal limits.
101. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2002 WL 1733618 at *9.
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certain quantity of data in order to list species would effectively
put the brakes on the whole process. 10 2
But what of the 95% certainty expectation so often observed
in scientific literature? Is that scientific? And if the scientists
expect it, shouldn't the agencies apply it in keeping with the best
available science? Actually, while many peer-reviewed journals
set the bar at 95% certainty for scientific conclusions, even that is
an arbitrarily determined figure with no scientific basis.10 3 More-
over, the D.C. Circuit has made clear that this certainty bench-
mark does not apply to the world of environmental regulation:
While awaiting [95%] certainty may constitute the typical mode of
scientific behavior, its appropriateness is questionable in environ-
mental medicine, where regulators seek to prevent harm that often
cannot be labeled "certain" until after it occurs .... Where a stat-
ute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult tocome by,
uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge ... we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of
cause and effect. 10 4
In sum, the strictly science mandate requires the use of uncer-
tain data, which in turn requires the agencies to articulate a plan
for how to work with uncertainty and gaps in data. This unad-
dressed matter and the policy decisions regarding risk aversion
are both weak spots in the ESA listing scheme as it stands.
C. Turning Lemons into Lemons: The Sloppy Application of
Poor Instructions
The agencies have not only failed to do anything to improve
upon the mistakes of Congress in drafting the ESA, they have
actively made it worse with their haphazard approach to imple-
menting the statute. Instead of attempting to clarify the defini-
tions of "endangered" and "threatened," the listing regulations
simply repeat the very same ambiguous language used in the stat-
102. See Daniel J. McGarvey & Brett Marshall, Making Sense of Scientists and
"Sound Science": Truth and Consequences for Endangered Species in the Klamath
Basin and Beyond, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 73, 108-09 (2005).
103. See DAVID S. MOORE, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 416-18
(3d ed. 1991).
104. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 25, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The term "precau-
tionary" in this quote does not likely refer to the "precautionary principle," a philo-
sophical approach of applying liberal environmental protections at greater economic
expense in order to be extremely risk-averse. Rather, I would posit that Judge
Wright is referring to statutes that are protective against future harms, and the ESA
clearly is such a statute.
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ute. 05 The little additional guidance FWS provides is an appar-
ent requirement in practice that "endangered" species be in
"imminent" danger of extinction, 10 6 but it provides no elucida-
tion of "imminent," which thus becomes just another equally am-
biguous standard.
"Not only do the agencies refuse to formulate explicit listing
standards, they offer no apology for the apparent inconsistency
of their decisions. ' 10 7 There is little relationship between listing
status and vulnerability: Many unlisted species are in great dan-
ger of extinction while those species that are listed are not always
the most vulnerable. 10 8 In addition, no standard exists even to
distinguish threatened from endangered, 10 9 so the agencies are
free to pick whichever they prefer, given the political climate of
the moment." 0
A study that reviewed the complete history of listing decisions
through 1996 found no evidence of consistent standards for iden-
tifying species as endangered or threatened."' This study found
that listed mammals consistently had higher remaining popula-
tions than did other species in the same listing category, demon-
strating that mammals were more likely to be listed than birds,
reptiles, or fish.112 The study further revealed that the language
used to justify listing decisions had inconsistent meanings, de-
pending upon the type of species." 3 For example, the use of the
terms "rare" and "extremely rare" did not correlate with popula-
tion data. 1 4 In addition, the study revealed that the final listings
often failed to include available biological data regarding both
"historic and current distribution, population, habitat, reproduc-
tive potential, and forage and/or prey information as well as in-
105. 50 C.F.R. § 424.02(e), (m).
106. See, e.g., Threatened Status for the Louisiana Black Bear and Related Rules,
57 Fed. Reg. 588, 592 (Jan. 1992) ("Endangered status is not chosen because the
threats are not believed to place the Louisiana black bear in imminent danger of
extinction.').
107. Doremus, supra note 19, at 1124.
108. Holsinger, supra note 7, at S-10.
109. Doremus, supra note 19, at 1123.
110. See infra notes 119-130 and accompanying text.
111. Easter-Pilcher, supra note 91, at 359.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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formation regarding past and future impact from humans,
exotics, pollution, disease, and [other] organisms. ' '115
Not only are listing decisions inconsistent, they are also inten-
tionally delayed, taking advantage of the listing bottleneck cre-
ated by the "warranted but precluded" category in order to
increase agency discretion.11 6 The category "has become a black
hole for unlisted endangered species," some of which spend de-
cades there.117 Far more species are designated as warranted but
precluded than are actually listed. 118 It is a horrible situation, but
one that works quite well for the agencies, as the more species
they list, the more actively involved they must become in the
conservation of these species.11 9 The Department of Interior has
made this very argument in objecting to increased funding for the
listing process, calling listing a "lower priority activity" that sim-
ply leads to greater funding needs for recovery, consultation, and
the like.1 20
D. Plenty of Blame to Go Around: The Intense Political
Pressures on the Listing Process
The significant agency discretion and complete lack of objec-
tive standards has opened the floodgates for political lobbying
from interest groups of all ideological persuasions. Political pres-
sure frequently inhibits the listing process.1 21 For the more con-
troversial species, "citizen petitions are required to begin that
process and frequently litigation is necessary to complete it." ' 122
This results in most species, out of those that make it at all,
reaching the list at an extremely late stage of their decline.1 23
And those are the lucky ones. "Faced with political opposition
and threats of lawsuits from property owners and other economi-
cally interested parties, the FWS sometimes finds that the sim-
plest course is to avoid making the listing decision altogether. ' 124
115. Id. (referring to data available in the set Mammals of the World, by Nowak
& Paradiso).
116. Houck, supra note 60, at 296.
117. Id. at 286.
118. Id. at 296.
119. Id. at 293-94.
120. Id.
121. Doremus, supra note 69, at 402.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 403.
124. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Tak-
ings and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 312 (1997) (noting that the FWS can
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Unfortunately, this decision is impossible to avoid, as failure to
list a dying species is itself a very meaningful decision.
Repeated investigations by the General Accounting Office
have consistently found that listing decisions are more politically
driven than based on science. 125 Particularly strong evidence of
this comes from a study published in 1999, which found "that
public opposition and support can substantially slow and hasten,
respectively, the progress of candidate species through the parts
of the listing process most directly under the agency's control."'126
The study found that the listing process was sped up by either a
supporting petition (direct public pressure) or the presence of a
pro-environment congressperson from the region in which the
species lives. On the other hand, the listing process was signifi-
cantly slowed down by either direct public opposition or the
presence of a pro-development congressperson from the region
in which the species lives.127 Interestingly, the study found that
simultaneous pressure from both sides could cause some initial
delay (especially where opposition dominates over support) but
generally resulted in speeding up the process, as significant addi-
tional support often materialized in response to early opposi-
tion. 28 This may sound like a net benefit to the species;
however, case-by-case decisionmaking driven by politics deprives
endangered species of fair and meaningful protection.
As one commentator has noted, "[e]ven relatively uncon-.
troversial decisions seem sensitive to the agencies' perception of
the direction of the political winds.' 29 In an apparent testing of
the political waters, FWS has proposed species for listing as
threatened and-with no change in the data but the notable ab-
sence of opposition to the listing-went on to list the species as
endangered.1 30
easily postpone the decision indefinitely by either a finding of inadequate informa-
tion or a determination that listing is warranted but precluded).
125. See, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, Endangered Species: Factors As-
sociated with Delayed Listing Decisions (1993); U.S. General Accounting Office,
Endangered Species: Spotted Owl Petition Evaluation Beset by Problems (1989);
U.S. General Accounting Office, Endangered Species: A Controversial Issue Need-
ing Resolution (1979).
126. Amy Whritenour Ando, Waiting to be Protected Under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay, 42 J.L. & Econ. 29, 29 (1999).
127. Id. at 47-48.
128. Id. at 50.
129. Doremus, supra note 19, at 1125.
130. Id. at 1125-26.
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A major problem with this politically driven system is that it
heavily favors charming species over those that may be more val-
uable to their ecosystems,' 3' abandoning the ESA's goal of pro-
tecting all species equally on the basis of threat alone. Although
they express an ethical interest in protecting biodiversity, "most
Americans remain fixed on a narrow segment of the biotic com-
munity-largely vertebrate animals, particularly creatures of spe-
cial historical, cultural, and aesthetic significance. '132 This is
truly as far as it gets from scientific reasoning. As the GAO
noted in its 1989 report on the spotted owl fiasco, citing the high
emotions and economic interests involved in listing species under
the ESA, FWS "needs to be able to demonstrate that its review
process and ultimate decisions have been as thorough, indepen-
dent, and objective as possible. 133 Indeed, a clear and objective
process is the only way out of this political quagmire. This leads
to the question: how do we get there?
IV.
THERE IS HOPE: SETrING QUANTITATIVE CRITERIA
LEADS TO GOOD POLICY, GOOD SCIENCE,
AND LESS CONFUSION
There are many great reasons to set quantitative criteria for
each listing category, the most important of which are consis-
tency, efficiency, transparency and legitimacy. It is important to
note that criteria-setting is not the same thing as requiring proof
that a species meets those criteria, for as discussed above, abso-
lute certainty has no place in environmental regulation. Rather,
quantitative criteria are preset standards for species vulnerabil-
ity, standards which can be met probabilistically on the basis of
incomplete information, such as through modeling. These nu-
merical values apply to various data sets, such as population
changes, and are discussed in more detail infra. Not only is it
advisable to set quantitative criteria, but there is a plausible argu-
ment that this method is itself the best available science. Indeed,
scientists worldwide have come together to develop the criteria
used for the IUCN Red List of species at varying levels of vulner-
131. Neither of these is a factor in the ESA, but at least the latter has some rela-
tionship to the ultimate goal of preserving biodiversity.
132. STEPHEN R. KELLERT, THE VALUE OF LIFE: BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND
HUMAN SOCIETY 62 (1996).
133. U.S. General Accounting Office, Endangered Species: Spotted Owl Petition
Evaluation Beset by Problems, at p. 2 (1989).
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ability. After decades of study went into preparing the IUCN
criteria, it would be wise for us to draw from this work-at least
methodologically-in setting our own.
A. Setting Quantitative Criteria Will Improve and Legitimize
the Listing Process
Most advocates for change in the ESA listing criteria base
their suggestions on what will be most likely to result in their
desired outcome, whether that be fewer or more generous list-
ings. 134 Those with an economic interest in reducing the number
of species listed generally advocate for requiring more scientific
data in order to list a species. They often rest this argument on
the combination of the strictly science mandate and the tradi-
tional scientific method, which tests a hypothesis with a strong
preference for the null hypothesis (that the hypothesis is
false). 135 This simply does not work in the ESA context. "To
concurrently employ both 'purely scientific' and 'ESA compliant'
standards in the face of substantial uncertainty will, at times, be
impossible, because the two doctrines have been fashioned to
prevent different types of errors."'1 36 Specifically, the scientific
method strongly favors the null hypothesis in order to prevent
false positives (called "Type I error"), while the ESA directs the
agencies to list all species that are endangered or threatened,
thus requiring avoidance of false negatives (called "Type II er-
ror"). 137 Requiring this traditional style of peer-reviewed scien-
tific method "would render ESA decision making more like
Ph.D. dissertation defenses,' 38 resulting in very poor protection
for the many vulnerable species whose cases cannot be proven
with the requisite certainty.
The "precautionary principle," advocated by some environ-
mental groups seeking to increase listings, can be equally unreal-
istic, depending upon the degree of precaution proposed. The
approach I critique here is one which would resolve all uncer-
134. Ruhl, supra note 84, at 563 ("What I find in the battle over ESA methodol-
ogy, however, is mostly rhetoric, intended to disguise efforts to shift the substantive
playing field.").
135. McGarvey & Marshall, supra note 102, at 100 ("Statistical inference does,
however, confer a categorical advantage to the null hypothesis; anytime the scientist
fails to accumulate sufficient proof of the alternative, she is obligated, under the
tenets of peer review, to defer to the null hypothesis.").
136. Id. at 104.
137. Id.
138. Ruhl, supra note 84, at 560-61.
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tainty in favor of listing a species, even where the stronger
probability suggests that the species would likely survive for the
foreseeable future without ESA protection. 139 This involves ef-
fectively flipping the scientific method over, such that the burden
of its high demand for proof is shifted in favor of listing, requir-
ing opponents of listing to prove the species is secure. This
method "would wreak economic havoc under the ESA and...
would severely reduce the statute's legitimacy from its already
tenuous status.' 140 This is the last thing anybody needs, espe-
cially those who support the ESA's continued strength.
Setting quantitative criteria suffers from neither of these ail-
ments. As a theoretical matter, setting criteria is a completely
separate thing from designating the degree of evidentiary proof
required to meet those criteria. As a practical matter, setting
quantitative criteria tends to render the process more objective,
requiring administrators to treat like cases alike through the use
of "reasonably definite standards. ' 141 "Striving for consistency
from case to case is essential for equal justice."' 42 Setting quanti-
tative criteria promotes fairness among species up for considera-
tion, preventing the ad hoc application of the above-described
philosophies. "Any federal regulatory policy must be uniform in
its application, or it will be perceived as unfair. '143 That is ex-
actly how both sides perceive the ESA's current implementation.
The ESA is in desperate need of increased political legitimacy,
which adherence to consistent standards would provide. In a
typically unscientific move, FWS developed a system that fa-
vored species according to life-form, 144 in spite of the fact that
there is no biological justification for treating vertebrates differ-
ently from invertebrates or plants.145 Congress immediately ad-
139. See id. at 561. Sometimes the term "precautionary principle" is used to pro-
mote acceptance of uncertainty in available data (for example in the letter of 300
scientists opposing the "sound science" bills), rather than requiring high degrees of
certainty in order to regulate to protect the environment. This view is in line with
my immediately preceding discussion and is not here criticized.
140. Id. at 562.
141. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 219 (1969).
142. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 116 (2d ed. 1978).
143. Emily Hartshorne Goodman, Defining Wetlands for Regulatory Purposes: A
Case Study in the Role of Science in Policymaking, 2 BUFF. ENvTL. L.J. 135, 137
(1994).
144. See 50 C.F.R. § 424 (1981).
145. COMMITTEE ON SPECIFIC ISSUES IN THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACt, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 53 (1995). NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 55
(1995).
STRENGTH IN NUMBERS
dressed this with its 1982 amendment forbidding discrimination
according to life-form, 146 yet the agencies continue to treat spe-
cies differently on this basis. For example, different methods of
measurement are used for measuring reproduction in different
classes of species (such as eggs per clutch, clutches per year,
young per pair, litter number, productivity), rather than a mea-
surement that could apply across taxa, such as realized natal-
ity. 147 "If the agency were mandated to address a set of
documented, objective, biological criteria within and across clas-
ses, and if these criteria were then made available to the scientific
community, the courts, and the public, then 'arbitrary or frivo-
lous' listing actions might be effectively eliminated." 148 In addi-
tion to increasing fairness among classes of species, consistent
standards would prevent the phenomenon of "shifting baseline
syndrome," in which species further along in their decline are
met with lower expectations for population levels, and thus in-
crease fairness among species with different levels of existing
human interference. 149
The use of clearly defined criteria is not only more consistent,
it is also far more efficient than determining individual expecta-
tions of viability for each and every species. This long debate
over each separate listing is the cause of the enormous backlog of
candidate species. "Until the backlog in listing species is ad-
dressed, developers will continue to be surprised by the discovery
of 'new' species, while environmentalists look at a mounting toll
of unlisted species that have entirely disappeared. 1 50 In addi-
tion, much time is wasted debating how to prioritize species for
consideration (e.g., based on degree of threat or potential for re-
covery) 151 or on how best to monitor the species languishing in
the waiting areas, 152 time that could be invested in a plan to get
rid of the backlog altogether.
Delays have not only led to this infamous backlog, but also
directly affected the outcome of individual listing decisions. In
146. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat.
1411.
147. Easter-Pilcher, supra note 91, at 361. "Realized natality" refers to the birth-
rate under given ecological conditions.
148. Id. at 362.
149. See Tear et al., supra note 90, at 836 (discussing this phenomenon in the
context of successive generations of wildlife managers resetting the baseline accord-
ing to the conditions at the start of their careers).
150. Houck, supra note 60, at 281.
151. See id. at 295 n.126.
152. See id. at 296 n.129.
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addition to discovering that political influences affect timing for
listings,153 Amy Ando's study also found that delay was corre-
lated with outcome. 154 Delay made it more likely for a species to
be "demoted" to an earlier stage in the process, 155 and less likely
to ever be "promoted" to the next stage in the process. 156 Delay
can also "enable private citizens and firms to take preemptive
irreversible actions (harvesting trees, developing land) on the
land that will be protected once the listing is made."'1 57 Of
course, Ando also found that delay increased the likelihood that
a species would go extinct while awaiting decision.' 58 Moreover,
even if a species does eventually get listed, "the longer the ESA
waits to protect a species, the worse the species' chances for
recovery."1 59
Opponents of setting standard listing criteria raise two argu-
ments: that doing so would be a clear articulation of policy and
thus violate the strictly science mandate, and that a "one-size-
fits-all" approach is incompatible with science because different
species function differently. 160 The first point misinterprets the
statutory text. The ESA directs the Secretary to "make determi-
nations required by subsection (a)(1) solely on the basis of the
best scientific and commercial data available to him after con-
ducting a review of the status of the species .... ,,161 This text
refers both to the individual listing subsection and to scientific
data available in relation to the review of an individual species.
The "determinations" it speaks of are clearly individual listing
determinations; it does not affect policies to general listing
issues. 162
Setting across-the-board criteria is not an individual listing de-
termination subject to this strictly science requirement, but
153. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
154. Ando, supra note 126, at 36.
155. Id. at 36, 45.
156. Id. at 44-45 ("The promotion hazard seems to rise to a peak around 2.5 years
and taper off after that; after about 6 years there is almost no probability of being
promoted.").
157. Id. at 36.
158. Id.
159. Gennet, supra note 94, at 1070.
160. See Kevin Eldridge, Whale for Sale?: New Developments in the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 24 GA. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 549, 561 n.62 (1995).
161. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
162. Since this text has been included in the ESA, there have been many policies
promulgated to address general listing issues, none of which has been struck down
on the basis of the strictly science mandate. 50 C.F.R. § 424.11 (2008).
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rather a formula in which to enter that scientific information. In
fact, such criteria would effectively limit the individual listing
considerations to those based on science, thereby increasing
compliance with the strictly science mandate. As scientists regu-
larly point out, once the criteria are set, analyzing viability
against those criteria "is purely a biological problem. ' 163 Setting
quantitative criteria takes policymaking out of the day-to-day
process.
Further, endangered and threatened are ambiguous terms,
thus allowing the agencies to interpret them in any reasonable
fashion. This position gains powerful support from Northwest
Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, in which the
Ninth Circuit granted Chevron deference 164 to the agencies' joint
policy that set criteria for listing distinct population segments
under the ESA. The court noted that "Congress expressly dele-
gated authority to the Services to develop criteria for evaluating
petitions to list endangered species. ' 165 Thus, setting quantita-
tive criteria would not violate the strictly science mandate;
rather, it would simply be an interpretive step necessary to im-
plement the statute. Once that interpretive step has been taken,
it will become far easier to abide by the strictly science mandate
in individual listings.
The second argument, which has been raised by FWS among
others, that a "one-size-fits-all" approach is incompatible with
science because different species function differently, is inappo-
site. As I will discuss in greater detail in the subpart on IUCN
criteria, much of this difficulty can be resolved by setting a vari-
ety of criteria that apply according to lifecycles of species, and
which encompass the varying ways species begin to exhibit de-
cline. Further flexibility would be possible if it were to become
necessary. For example, we could treat the criteria as guidelines
that must be followed most of the time, and require strict proce-
dures for explaining any deviation from them. The possibility of
such exceptions would enable FWS to address outliers, but the
difficulty of making exceptions would strongly discourage the
haphazard approach we have now.
163. Holsinger, supra note 7, at S-10; see also Eric W. Sanderson, How Many
Animals Do We Want to Save? The Many Ways of Setting Population Target Levels
for Conservation, 56 BIOSCIENCE 911 (2006); Tear et al., supra note 90, at 835.
164. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
165. Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1141
(9th Cir. 2007).
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For an excellent example of how well this can work, we need
look no further than Florida, the state that has been the most
willing to embrace the setting of quantitative objectives for wild-
life conservation. 66 "The Florida Forever Act of 1999 explicitly
recognizes that measurable goals are central to successful conser-
vation programs. 1' 67 Florida used a series of population viability
analyses to determine its criteria for selecting areas of land for
conservation.1 68 Even when this preset criteria led to the discov-
ery that massive areas of land were needed to meet the objec-
tives, the plans were able to survive the ensuing public outcry.169
Thanks to a solid foundation, "the objectives remained intact be-
cause of the defensibility of the process, independent of per-
ceived feasibility."'170
Finally, setting quantitative criteria would meet several implicit
goals Congress suggested via the ESA's best available science
mandate. Professor Holly Doremus provides the following list of
purposes most likely served by the mandate:
First, it could promote substantively more accurate decisions in a
context where the legislature could readily conclude that science
dominates decision-making needs. Second, it might increase public
trust and build political credibility by encouraging the polity to be-
lieve that decisions are objectively determined by the evidence,
rather than chosen arbitrarily or to serve the particular values of
the decision maker .... Third, it could affect judicial review of
agency decisions, either protecting those decisions from close ex-
amination by invoking special deference to agency expertise or in-
viting more stringent review by providing the courts with an
additional standard to enforce. 171
Each of these potential purposes is best served by setting ob-
jective quantitative criteria. First, it would result in listings that
were more accurate across the board by eliminating the many
confounding factors discussed above. Second, it would remove
the subjectivity that eats away at public trust. Third, it would
166. Tear et al., supra note 90, at 843.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Doremus, supra note 69, at 418 (noting that "[tihere is no direct legislative
history explaining the ESA's best available science mandate."). The list included a
fourth possible purpose, not applicable here: "Fourth, it could alter the decision-
making process in ways that might be important (to fans or foes of regulation) either
for their own sake or because they make a difference in the substance of the ulti-
mate decisions." Id.
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significantly strengthen judicial review by providing clear stan-
dards for that review. The Supreme Court has held that the best
available science standard's "obvious purpose ...is to ensure
that the ESA not be implemented haphazardly, on the basis of
speculation or surmise. '172
B. Quantitative Criteria IS the Best Available Science
The classification of the constituents of chaos, nothing less is here
essayed. Listen to what the best and latest authorities have laid
down.
Herman Melville, Moby Dick
Not only would setting quantitative criteria aid in attaining the
goals underlying the best available science mandate, this sort of
criteria arguably is the best available science. Indeed, while this
Article is the first in the law review context to focus on the pro-
posal of setting quantitative criteria for ESA listing, the argu-
ment is found throughout the scientific literature. 173 Lawyers
and politicians should heed the advice of biologists on this in-
credibly important regulatory matter.
We hear a lot about the "sound science" movement, which has
led to a number of bills proposing tougher scientific-method-like
requirements for the scientific data that is needed to list a species
(but, of course, not to deny listing). 174 As already discussed, such
scientific methods are based upon principles inapplicable to the
ESA context and require data that rarely 'exists. Thus, such
methods are not "sound" for use in the listing process. 175 The
scientists know better-more than 300 of them, including promi-
nent members of the National Academy of Sciences, signed a let-
ter to Congress opposing the "sound science" bills. The scientists
noted that the bills would exclude the soundest science for the
172. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176 (1997).
173. Leah R. Gerber & Lelia T. Hatch, Are We Recovering? An Evaluation of
Recovery Criteria Under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 12 ECOLOGY 672 (2002);
Michael K. Young & Amy L. Harig, A Critique of the Recovery of Greenback Cut-
throat Trout, 15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1575, 1578 (2001); Leah R. Gerber &
Douglas P. DeMaster, A Quantitative Approach to Endangered Species Act Classifi-
cation of Long-Lived Vertebrates: Application to the North Pacific Humpback Whale,
13 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1203, 1204 (Oct. 1999).
174. See, e.g., Sound Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2002,
H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. (2d Sess.) (2002), reintroduced in both houses as Sound
Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2003, H.R. 1662, 108th Cong.,
and Sound Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2004, S. 2009, 108th
Cong.
175. See generally McGarvey & Marshall, supra note 102.
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ESA context: population viability analysis and modeling. 176 Dis-
cussing this letter with the press, Dr. David Blockstein, a leading
conservation biologist, stated that the "scientific methodologies
[must be] defined and managed by scientists, [or] they have no
credibility."' 177 Fortunately, scientists have collaborated on an
excellent methodology for endangered species identification,
which I discuss below in the section on IUCN criteria.
"[S]cientists understand that sound science is more of a process
than an end point. ' 178 Science is not just a set of data, or even
the interpretations of that data, but is also procedural, in that it is
itself about process. 179 There is no single universal scientific
method, but rather various methodologies which apply to varying
contexts. Scientists define "sound science" differently than poli-
ticians do for the ESA context: "The documented, systematic
consideration of a set of well-defined variables and categories
within them is a necessary first step in the development of a
sound, scientific methodology for making determinations of
endangerment." 180
In Andrea Easter-Pilcher's study,18' she found that existing
listings reflect a significant lack of data and instead rest primarily
on general description. 182 Setting quantitative criteria would be
an excellent way to work with a lack of data. As she notes, "this
lack does not preclude systematic consideration of a set of better-
defined variables and categories within them."'81 3 Indeed, this
would be a significantly better way to deal with otherwise insuffi-
cient data:
The potential use of data-hungry techniques such as population vi-
ability analysis fades in light of the high levels of missing data re-
ported in this study. However, it is possible that by consistently
addressing definitive biological criteria a computerized ranking al-
gorithm such as classification and regression trees may be devel-
176. Ellen Paul, Science: The Newest Political Football in the Endangered Species
Game, 52 BIOSCIENCE 792 (2002); see also Cat Lazaroff, Species Protection Law Key
to Grizzly Survival, Environment News Service, July 23, 2002, available at http://
www.ens-newswire.com/ens/ u12002/2002-07-23-06.asp.
177. Id.
178. McGarvey & Marshall, supra note 102, at 75.
179. Doremus, supra note 19, at 1057-58.
180. Easter-Pilcher, supra note 91, at 359.
181. See Id. (discussing her study's findings regarding FWS listing mammals more
easily than other species).
182. Id. at 357.
183. Id.
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oped and used to evaluate, compare, and rank the status of
different species.184
While we cannot cure the inevitable defect of information
gaps, we can certainly learn to compare the data that we do have
in a consistent manner, allowing us to gain a better understand-
ing of how our limited data does inform us. Setting quantitative
criteria is the best way to accomplish this.
C. The Scientist-Developed IUCN Listing Criteria: America's
Next Top Model?
Now for the best news of all: much of the work required to set
up this more objective process has already been done. The Inter-
national Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) is an in-
ternational nongovernmental organization whose mission is to
provide scientific expertise free of political influence to aid con-
servation programs worldwide. 185 It initially formed in 1948 and
released its first Red Data Book (listing species by degree of vul-
nerability) in 1960.186 The IUCN's most current "Red List Cate-
gories and Criteria," which sets out clear quantitative criteria for
identifying varying threat levels, were created over the course of
more than a decade of collaboration and revision by scientists
from around the world.187 I propose that we use these criteria as
a model for setting new ESA listing criteria, ideally enlisting the
aid and support of scientists from the IUCN.
In drafting the early endangered species statutes, both houses
of Congress specifically suggested that reference to the IUCN's
Red Book "should be especially valuable in identifying" species
worthy of being listed under U.S. legislation.18 8 They also recom-
mended direct consultation with the IUCN as a step in the listing
process. 189 Application of the IUCN criteria would put us in
good company, as the current criteria "have become widely rec-
ognized internationally," and are currently applied "by numerous
governmental and non-governmental organizations."' 90 Perhaps
184. Id. (internal citation omitted).
185. See ROBERT BOARDMAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE CON-
SERVATION OF NATURE 42, 47, 74-75 (1981).
186. Id. at 47, 55.
187. INT'L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES
[IUCN], IUCN RED LIST CATEGORIES AND CRITERIA: VERSION 3.1, 2-3 (2001)
[hereinafter "IUCN Criteria"].
188. S. REP. No. 91-526, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 91-382, at 6.
189. Id.
190. IUCN Criteria, supra note 187, at 1.
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most notable is the 1994 adoption of IUCN-devised criteria for
use in the primary international treaty to protect endangered
species, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). 191 The new CITES
criteria have been described as "the most objective standards in
endangered species listing being used in the world,"'192 and after
the adoption of these criteria for use in CITES, "the process of
listing species became clearer and firmer."'1 93
The IUCN articulates four goals behind its new criteria:
" to provide a system that can be applied consistently by dif-
ferent people;
" to improve objectivity by providing users with clear gui-
dance on how to evaluate different factors which affect the
risk of extinction;
" to provide a system which will facilitate comparisons across
widely different taxa;
" to give people using threatened species lists a better under-
standing of how individual species were classified. 194
These goals read like a wishlist of what is most needed to re-
form the ESA listing process, leaving only the question of how
well the criteria accomplish them. Given the "[e]xtensive consul-
tation and testing" that went into developing the criteria,195 they
are at a minimum better qualified to attain those goals than any-
thing else we have to work with.
The IUCN Criteria set out nine categories into which all spe-
cies somewhere fall: Extinct, Extinct in the Wild, Critically En-
dangered, Endangered, Vulnerable, Near Threatened, Least
Concern, Data Deficient, and Not Evaluated. 196 Species that fall
into the three categories from Vulnerable through Critically En-
dangered are generally referred to as Threatened' 97 and are the
191. Convention on Int'l Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
[CITES], Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
192. Shawn M.-Dansky, The CITES "Objective" Listing Criteria: Are They "Ob-
jective" Enough to Protect the African Elephant?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 961, 979 (1999)
(criticizing the criteria for being "not completely objective, as they still allow Parties
to take into consideration range-states' economic and social problems). Due to the
ESA's prohibition on such considerations, the weakness complained of here would
not exist in our criteria.
193. Scott Hitch, Losing the Elephant Wars: CITES and the "Ivory Ban", 27 GA.
J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 167, 179 (1998).
194. IUCN Criteria, supra note 187, at 1.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 14-15.
197. Id. at 5.
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sort of species on which the ESA focuses. The five criteria used
for each of these three categories function very similarly, distin-
guishable primarily by the actual numbers they set. These five
criteria were designed to collectively address the viability indicia
of all taxa, so for any given species one criterion will be more
applicable than another.198 For this reason, each species is to be
evaluated against all criteria, but need meet only one criterion in
order to be listed at that level. 199
The first criterion is based on a reduction in population, with
varying percentages depending upon the cause and timeframe at
issue. For a population reduction over the last ten years or three
generations (whichever is longer), but for which the cause has
been discovered and ceased and is reversible, the criteria inter-
pret a 90% reduction as Critically Endangered, a 70% reduction
as Endangered and a 50% reduction as Vulnerable. 200 For that
same time period, but where the cause has not ceased or may not
be reversible, the criteria interpret an 80% reduction as Critically
Endangered, a 50% reduction as Endangered and a 30% reduc-
tion as Vulnerable.20 1 If projecting into the future for the same
period of time, the criteria use these same latter percentages, and
likewise for a period of that length which is presently underway
'(part past, part future). 202
The second criterion sets quantitative figures for geographic
range, dealing both with extent of occurrence and area of occu-
pancy.203 The third criterion considers total population size in
conjunction with decline and/or fluctuations. 20 4 The fourth crite-
rion simply looks at population size, without requiring decline or
fluctuation, and thus sets the population figures for each category
significantly lower than those in the third criterion. 20 5 The fifth
and final criterion is pure population viability analysis, requiring
a probability of extinction in the wild within varying lengths of
time/generations and at varying percentages, depending upon the
198. Id. This is also a powerful response to the most common argument made
against setting standardized criteria: that it is not biologically sound to use a "one-
size-fits-all" approach, revealing that argument to be a pretext for holding onto the
great discretion the agencies now enjoy.
199. Id. at 5, 16-23.
200. Id. at 16-23.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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category. 20 6 Although all five criteria are divided into three cate-
gories of vulnerability, it would be possible, ideally through con-
sultation with the IUCN, to structure the criteria around the
ESA's threatened and endangered categories.
The IUCN Criteria were built on the cutting edge of develop-
ments in population viability analysis, have stood up well for
over a decade, and "represent a significant advance over other
systems. ' 20 7 If the Services refuse to consider using this type of
quantitative criteria for listing endangered and threatened spe-
cies under the ESA, Congress should direct them to do so. If
neither branch makes any effort to move in this direction, the
public deserves an explanation as to why the best scientific devel-
opments are not being utilized.
V.
WHICH BRANCH MIGHT HAVE THE MOST SWAY?
In light of the importance of moving toward the use of quanti-
tative criteria in the ESA listing process, upon which the future
of biodiversity in the U.S. may well depend, it is worthwhile to
consider the various avenues for doing so. Indeed, there is at
least some potential in all three branches of government, though
the balance of pros and cons greatly varies among them. This
potential is most heavily concentrated in the legislative and exec-
utive branches. Given the difficulty in locating individuals with
the motivation to use their constitutional authority for this cause,
let us consider each avenue with an open mind, as the best or
most obvious one may not be available.
A. The Regulatory Approach
The most obvious-and likely the easiest-path to improving
the listing process would be rulemaking within the very agencies
that must thereafter implement it. There are many reasons why
administrative regulation is likely the best way to design the
much-needed quantitative criteria for listing endangered and
threatened species. First, the rulemaking process would allow for
diverse public comment, both with regard to the policy choices
involved in setting the numerical thresholds and also as to the
scientific community's views on the criteria design itself. Second,
administrative rules could adapt more easily than legislation
206. Id.
207. Holsinger, supra note 7, at S-10.
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could as scientific knowledge develops and as we see how the
first set of criteria work in practice. Third, setting the criteria
may be too politically difficult for a split Congress, whereas the
agencies can more easily work together on the process. Finally,
taking this step could help the agencies to rehabilitate their
tainted image after decades of unscientific listing decisions, as
well as allow them to escape from under the intense political
pressures weighing down the listing process.
There are also disadvantages to getting this done at the admin-
istrative level, though they are likely outweighed by the advan-
tages. First, the agencies lack the ability to adjust their own
funding as may be required in order to achieve more comprehen-
sive listing reform, which would be a desirable approach. That
said, this would not affect their ability to set quantitative criteria,
which is the most valuable step in the reform. Perhaps the stick-
ier issues would relate to limits on agency authority. Not only do
some argue that setting listing thresholds would violate the
ESA's strictly science mandate,208 but doing so could also raise
some concerns regarding whether Congress' leaving this step to
the agencies was an excessive delegation of legislative power.20 9
B. Statutory Amendment by Congress
Congressional amendment would allow for more comprehen-
sive reform of the listing process. In addition to addressing the
need for quantitative criteria, Congress could also require some
amount of data-gathering in cases where there is insufficient data
to evaluate a species against those criteria, and could fund that
mandate.2t 0 If Congress were to take a stab at setting the crite-
ria, it could depart from the existing endangered/threatened pair
and split species into more categories (more akin to the IUCN
criteria), which the agencies cannot do. This would also avoid
the questions of delegation and otherwise questionable agency
authority, but could raise problems with lack of adaptability and
208. See supra notes 161-165 and accompanying text for the arguments against
this position.
209. See generally David M. Wagner, American Trucking: The "New Nondelega-
tion Doctrine" is Dead (Long Live the Old One?), 11 U. BALT. J. ENvrL. L. 25
(2003) (arguing that the American Trucking case may have actually breathed new
life into the nondelegation doctrine by eliminating both the spectrum approach to
considering delegations and the potential for agencies to cure the defect).
210. Although such studies could delay the listing process for those species, given
that it would only be applicable in cases of insufficient data (which generally result
in no listing at all), this would likely be harmless.
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possibly inadequate public input on the details. In light of these
problems, along with the political gridlock Congress tends to ex-
perience in dealing with the ESA, it might be wise for Congress
to merely direct the agencies to set quantitative criteria, provid-
ing them with an intelligible principle for doing so. This would
avoid the need to make the biggest policy decision, which is
where exactly to set the thresholds. It would also resolve the
questions regarding agency authority to set the criteria. Indeed,
if the agencies do not act on this need soon, Congress should
take this step.
C. Pressure from the Courts
Finally, courts may begin to push for better criteria, especially
when judges are made aware of the IUCN criteria. This is the
least likely avenue for reform, but one federal court has already
struck down a Fish & Wildlife Service interpretation of "foresee-
able future" in the definition of "threatened" because it strayed
too far from the IUCN's criteria without explaining that depar-
ture.211 This could certainly turn out to be an isolated incident,
but if attorneys continue to argue the point, it may well become a
wider trend.
VI.
CONCLUSION
We live in a time of rapidly increasing environmental aware-
ness. While it is no new concept that everything is connected,
such that harming one thing can harm others whose relationship
is not readily apparent, it is a concept that is spreading more than
ever in the face of global warming and extraordinary rates of ex-
tinction. These issues have led to widespread concern, so our
new administration should take heed. Not only do we need to
211. See Western Watersheds Project v. Foss, 2005 WL 2002473 (D. Idaho, Aug.
19, 2005) ("Furthermore, other agencies and organizations, have designated much
lower extinction risk within 100 years as qualifying a species for a 'threatened' sta-
tus. For example, in this case, the FWS rejected the timeframes suggested by the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature ('IUCN'), which places a 10%
extinction risk within 100 years as falling within the definition of 'threatened.' In
fact, in its own notes, the FWS acknowledged that its definition of 'foreseeable fu-
ture' and 'threatened' differed from that of IUCN and observed that it would have
to explain why it used a different standard. The Court could not glean from the
expansive administrative record where the FWS explained this deviation from
IUCN guidelines for extinction risk.") (internal citations to administrative record
omitted).
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maintain thriving ecosystems at home, but the U.S. is a relevant
player in worldwide biodiversity, so we have a duty to implement
our primary biodiversity statute effectively. Setting appropriate
quantitative criteria for listing species is perhaps the single most
important step in this direction.

